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I. INTRODUCTION 
As Justice Learned Hand once observed, it is “a totally differ-
ent thing to search a man’s pockets and use against him what they 
contain, from ransacking his house for everything which may in-
criminate him.”1 As Chief Justice Roberts explained in Riley v. Cal-
ifornia, that statement is no longer true, due to the advent of the 
digital age and the proliferation of electronic devices containing 
immense storage capabilities.2 It is much more likely in the modern 
age that a man’s person will contain everything which may incrim-
inate him, simply by the man’s possession of a modern digital stor-
age device, such as a cell phone, computer, or external hard drive.3 
In 2015, a survey conducted by the PEW Research Center revealed 
that 92% of U.S. adults owned a cellphone, with 68% of U.S. adults 
owning a “smartphone.”4 The survey also concluded 73% of U.S. 
adults owned a desktop or laptop computer and 45% of U.S. adults 
                                                          
 
 1. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2490–91 (2014) (citing United States v. 
Kirschenblatt, 16 F.2d 202, 203 (2d Cir. 1926)). 
 2. Id. at 2491.  
 3. See id. 
 4. Monica Anderson, Technology Device Ownership: 2015, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Oct. 
29, 2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/10/29/technology-device-ownership-2015/. 
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owned a tablet computer.5 These digital devices store personal and 
private information in staggering amounts, a fact that has im-
portant consequences on a person’s right to privacy under the 
Fourth Amendment. 
The Fourth Amendment guarantees “a safeguard to the liberty 
of the individual,”6 by “protect[ing] citizens against unreasonable 
governmental searches and seizures.”7 In defining what consti-
tutes an unreasonable governmental search and seizure, the Su-
preme Court of the United States has identified several exceptions 
to the Fourth Amendment’s broad protections. One of these excep-
tions to the Fourth Amendment is known as the private search doc-
trine, first highlighted in Walter v. United States,8 and further 
elaborated in United States v. Jacobsen.9 
The private search doctrine relies upon the premise that the 
Fourth Amendment only applies to governmental action, not action 
by private citizens.10 Therefore, if a private citizen, acting upon his 
own volition and not at the behest of a governmental agent, 
searches another person’s private personal property (in which the 
person possesses a reasonable expectation of privacy) and finds in-
criminating material, the private citizen is permitted to disclose 
that incriminating material to a government agent.11 The govern-
ment agent is then permitted to search and seize the incriminating 
material without first obtaining a warrant.12 
The private search doctrine was initially introduced in rela-
tion to a private search of a physical container — a package 
                                                          
 5. Id. 
 6. NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 9 (1937). 
 7. THOMAS K. CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ITS HISTORY AND 
INTERPRETATION xix (Carolina Academic Press, 2008). 
 8. Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 650 (1980). 
 9. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 112 (1984).  
 10. Id. at 113.   
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
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shipped through FedEx.13 In the advent of the digital age, however, 
the private search doctrine has been routinely applied to searches 
of digital containers, such as computers, flash drives, cell phones, 
and CDs.14 In applying the private search doctrine to digital con-
tainers, there has been some contention amongst the United States 
Circuit Courts of Appeals regarding the proper determination of 
permissible scope for the subsequent government search following 
the initial private search.15 The specific issue of contention is how 
to define the scope of the search and what constitutes a “container” 
for purposes of determining what the government agent is permit-
ted to search.16 Three options for defining the container have been 
introduced amongst the various circuits, the district courts, and 
legal scholars: the device itself, the individual file or image origi-
nally searched, or the exposed data of the individual file or image 
(the data visible on the screen).17 
The United States Circuit Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and 
Seventh Circuits hold that the proper limitation of scope is to the 
digital storage device itself.18 The reason for this holding is the as-
sumption that when a private person searches the digital device, 
by opening the device itself, the private person has frustrated any 
                                                          
 13. Id. at 111.  
 14. United States v. Sparks, 806 F.3d 1323, 1330 (11th Cir. 2015) (cell phone); United 
States v. Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d 478, 479 (6th Cir. 2015) (computer); United States v. Tosti, 
733 F.3d 816, 818 (9th Cir. 2013) (computer); Rann v. Atchison, 689 F.3d 832, 833 (7th Cir. 
2012) (ZIP drive and camera memory card); United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449, 451 (5th 
Cir. 2001) (ZIP disks). 
 15. See Orin S. Kerr, 11th Circuit deepens the circuit split on applying the private 
search doctrine to computers, WASH. POST (Dec. 2, 2015), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/12/02/11th-circuit-deepens-the-circuit-split-on-
applying-the-private-search-doctrine-to-computers/. 
 16. See id. 
 17. Sparks, 806 F.3d 1323; Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d 478; Tosti, 733 F.3d 816; Rann, 
689 F.3d 832; Runyan, 275 F.3d 449; Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 
119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 554 (Dec. 2005). 
 18. See Rann, 689 F.3d 832; Runyan, 275 F.3d 499.   
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remaining expectation of privacy in the device.19 Therefore, any 
subsequent governmental action cannot be defined as a search for 
Fourth Amendment purposes.20 The implication of this ruling is 
that even if the private person has only searched one file on the 
device, the entire device is open to the subsequent government in-
vestigation.21 The government agent can view any file, image, or 
data on the device, without a warrant, even if it has not already 
been viewed by the private searcher.22 
The United States Circuit Courts of Appeals for the Sixth and 
Eleventh Circuits, and the Ninth Circuit through dicta, hold the 
Fifth and Seventh Circuits’s definition of container is too expansive 
and in violation of the purpose of the Fourth Amendment.23 These 
circuits instead hold that the proper definition of “container” is lim-
ited to the individual file or image searched by the private person 
as part of the initial private search.24 The Sixth and Eleventh Cir-
cuits maintain the expansive storage capacity of modern digital de-
vices and the improbability of virtual certainty in what those de-
vices may contain mandates a stricter definition of “container,” 
particularly in light of the important policy considerations regard-
ing modern digital devices highlighted by the Supreme Court in 
Riley v. California.25 
As this article will make clear, the proper definition of “con-
tainer” is the definition pronounced by the Sixth and Eleventh Cir-
cuits. This definition preserves and furthers the purpose of the 
Fourth Amendment, properly takes into account the unique char-
acteristics and implications of modern digital devices, appropri-
ately balances the competing interests of governmental autonomy 
and privacy protection, and befittingly incorporates the current 
                                                          
 19. See Rann, 689 F.3d 832; Runyan, 275 F.3d 499.   
 20. See Rann, 689 F.3d 832; Runyan, 275 F.3d 499.   
 21. See Rann, 689 F.3d 832; Runyan, 275 F.3d 499. 
 22. See Rann, 689 F.3d 832; Runyan, 275 F.3d 499. 
 23. See Sparks, 806 F.3d at 1336; Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d at 491; Tosti, 733 F.3d at 
821–22.  
 24. See Sparks, 806 F.3d at 1336;  Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d at 491; Tosti, 733 F.3d at 
821–22. 
 25. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. at 2490–91; Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d at 491; 
Sparks, 806 F.3d at 1336. 
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stance of the Supreme Court regarding privacy interests in the 
modern digital age. 
This comment will first briefly give background information 
on the current circuit split issue by introducing the Fourth Amend-
ment and the private search doctrine in general. It will then ex-
plore what it means to “exceed the scope of the private search” un-
der the private search doctrine, by discussing the physical con-
tainer distinction and then the digital zone distinction highlighted 
by Orin S. Kerr. Next, this comment will examine how the various 
circuit courts of appeals have applied the container distinction to 
digital storage devices and advocate for the approach taken by the 
Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh United States Circuit Courts of Ap-
peals in limiting the digital container definition to an individual 
file or image on the digital device. In explaining how the proper 
definition of digital container is the individual file or image, this 
comment will conclude with a discussion of the important policy 
interests at stake on either side of the divide: the governmental 
interest in investigating and prosecuting criminal activity and pre-
serving digital evidence on one side, and the personal privacy in-
terests on the other side in limiting erosion of the Fourth Amend-
ment and arbitrary governmental interference with important pri-
vacy rights. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution was 
enacted on September 25th, 1789, as part of the Bill of Rights, and 
ratified on December 15th, 1791.26 The text of the amendment 
states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, 
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
                                                          
 26. Barry Friedman & Orin Kerr, The Fourth Amendment, NAT’L CONSTITUTION 
CTR., http://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/amendments/amendment-iv (last 
visited Nov. 9, 2016).  
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and particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized.27 
The Fourth Amendment was placed in the Constitution by our 
Founding Fathers and the ratifying generation in response to colo-
nial experiences with general warrants in an era of unchecked 
power of the British government to “enter private homes and con-
duct dragnet searches for evidence of any crime.”28 In drafting the 
Fourth Amendment, the Founding Fathers sought to ensure the 
federal government lacked the power to conduct general and un-
reasonable searches and seizures, and so prohibited general war-
rants, mandated that all searches and seizures had to be reasona-
ble, and required that only specific warrants detailing the place to 
be searched and the persons or things to be seized would be per-
mitted.29 
Over the last 224 years, the Supreme Court has sought to de-
velop “a comprehensive set of rules regulating law enforcement” to 
ensure the important policies of the Fourth Amendment are pre-
served in modern jurisprudence.30 Despite this dedication to pre-
serving privacy interests, the Supreme Court has allowed for cer-
tain exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s protections including 
the search-incident-to-lawful-arrest exception,31 the plain view 
doctrine,32 the exigent circumstances exception,33 and the private 
search doctrine,34 among others. This article specifically relates to 
the private search doctrine and the permissible scope of the excep-
tion as applied to digital containers. To determine the permissible 
scope, we need first to understand the private search doctrine in 
general. 
                                                          
 27. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
 28. Kerr, supra note 17, at 536.  
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. PHILLIP A. HUBBART, MAKING SENSE OF SEARCH & SEIZURE LAW: A FOURTH 
AMENDMENT HANDBOOK 268 (2015). 
 32. Id. at 293.  
 33. Id. at 294.  
 34. Id. at 119–20.  
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The private search doctrine is based on the premise that the 
Fourth Amendment does not apply to actions taken by private cit-
izens.35 It only applies to unreasonable governmental searches and 
seizures.36 This principle was clearly shown in United States v. Ja-
cobsen.37 Jacobsen presented the following issue: Is a government 
agent permitted to search a person’s private property, without a 
warrant, if the government agent is told by a private individual 
that the property contains illegal substances, and that property 
has already been inspected by the private individual?38 
In Jacobsen, employees of a private freight carrier observed a 
white, powdery substance in a package, which originally had been 
wrapped in multiple layers, but which had become damaged and 
partially opened during transit.39 The freight carrier supervisor 
and employees unwrapped this package, found a tube inside made 
of silver tape, cut open the tube, and found a series of Ziplock bags, 
which all contained a white, powdery substance.40 The supervisor 
notified the Drug Enforcement Administration, who sent an agent 
to investigate the claim.41 Upon viewing the package, the DEA 
agent removed the plastic bags from the tube, observed the white, 
powdery substance inside, opened each of the four bags, and re-
moved some of the substance.42 A field test on this substance re-
vealed that the material was cocaine.43 Results from the field test 
                                                          
 35. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. (“This Court has also consistently construed this protection as proscribing 
only governmental action; it is wholly inapplicable ‘to a search or seizure, even an unreasona-
ble one, effected by a private individual not acting as an agent of the Government or with the 
participation or knowledge of any governmental official.’”). 
 38. See id. at 113.  
 39. Id. at 111. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 111. 
 42. Id. at 111–12.  
 43. Id. at 112. 
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were used to obtain a warrant to search the address where the co-
caine was to be sent, and that search resulted in the arrest of the 
respondents on charges of possession of an illegal substance with 
intent to distribute.44 
At trial, respondents moved to suppress the evidence discov-
ered through the DEA field test and the subsequent search of the 
respondents’s address, arguing that the DEA agent’s search of the 
package violated the respondents’s Fourth Amendment rights 
against unreasonable governmental search and seizure.45 As such, 
any warrant obtained as a result of the initial search was “the 
product of an illegal search and seizure” and thus inadmissible at 
trial.46 This motion was denied at the trial level but that decision 
was reversed on appeal.47 The Supreme Court of the United States 
granted certiorari to resolve the issue and ruled in favor of the 
DEA, holding that “the federal agents did not infringe any consti-
tutionally protected privacy interest that had not already been 
frustrated as the result of private conduct.”48 The DEA search and 
field test was “constitutionally reasonable.”49 
United States v. Jacobsen was a landmark case for legal anal-
ysis under the Fourth Amendment because it conclusively estab-
lished the private search doctrine.50 The Jacobsen majority also de-
fined a “search” as occurring when “an expectation of privacy that 
society is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed.”51 Relying 
on earlier precedent set in Walter v. United States, the majority 
conclusively decided that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to 
private action, whether or not that action is reasonable.52 The im-
portance of this ruling cannot be overstated; the Jacobsen majority 
                                                          
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 112. 
 48. Id. at 126. 
 49. Id. 
 50. See id. at 113; United States v. Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d 478, 481 (6th Cir. 2015). 
 51. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113. 
 52. Id. (citing Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 662 (1980)). 
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opened the floodgates for admissibility of evidence obtained 
through private searches by definitively holding that such searches 
were not illegal.53 To illustrate the gravity of this decision, consider 
the following hypothetical. 
Johnny owns a computer which he regularly uses to view child 
pornography. One day, while Johnny is out, Jane, Johnny’s girl-
friend, takes his computer and discovers several files containing 
child pornography. Jane turns Johnny’s computer into the police, 
who then search the files Jane discovered. Under the Jacobsen rul-
ing, Johnny has no ability to argue that the government search was 
in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, even though the gov-
ernment agents searched his personal property without first ob-
taining a warrant. The typical warrant requirement for govern-
ment searches and seizures is extinguished in Johnny’s case 
simply because his property was first searched by Jane. If Johnny’s 
property had not first been searched by Jane, the government 
would have been required to obtain a search warrant before seizing 
and inspecting the computer. 
What accounts for the different treatment? The Jacobsen ma-
jority, in defining a “search” as occurring when a person’s reason-
able expectation of privacy has been frustrated, by corollary, also 
determined when a search does not occur under the Fourth Amend-
ment.54 A “search,” for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, does 
not occur when a person does not have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the property.55 When a private individual searches a per-
son’s property, that private individual frustrates any remaining 
expectation of privacy in the property.56 Therefore, any subsequent 
                                                          
 53. See id. 
 54. See id. at 117. 
 55. See id. 
 56. See id. 
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governmental investigation of the property cannot possibly fall un-
der the Jacobsen definition of a “search.”57 
Despite this permissive ruling, the Jacobsen majority did 
place restrictions on the admissibility of evidence obtained through 
private searches in two ways. First, the subsequent government 
search cannot exceed the scope of the original private search.58 Ad-
ditional invasions of a person’s privacy will be tested “by the degree 
to which they exceed the scope of the private search.”59 Second, the 
private searcher cannot be an “agent” of the government nor acting 
at the behest of a government agent.60 In other words, the private 
searcher must be truly private, and not influenced in any way by a 
government agent or coerced into searching the private property 
by a government agent or organization.61 
These two caveats of the private search doctrine give rise to 
numerous qualifying questions, particularly in the advent of the 
digital age. It is the first caveat — the restriction that the subse-
quent government search cannot exceed the scope of the prior pri-
vate search — that is under scrutiny in this article, and which 
gives rise to a current circuit split.62 The question for consideration 
                                                          
 57. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 117 (“The Fourth Amendment is implicated only if the au-
thorities use information with respect to which the expectation of privacy has not already been 
frustrated.”). 
 58. Id. at 116 (“The Government may not exceed the scope of the private search un-
less it has the right to make an independent search.”). 
 59. Id. at 115. 
 60. Id. at 113 (“This Court has also consistently construed this protection as proscrib-
ing only governmental action; it is wholly inapplicable ‘to a search or seizure, even an unrea-
sonable one, effected by a private individual not acting as an agent of the Government or with 
the participation or knowledge of any governmental official.’” (citing Walter v. United States, 
447 U.S. 649, 662 (1980)).  
 61. See id. 
 62. The current circuit split is between the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals 
for the Fifth and Seventh Circuits on the one hand, and the United States Circuit Courts of 
Appeals for the Sixth, Ninth (through dicta), and Eleventh Circuits on the other hand. Orin 
Kerr, Sixth Circuit creates circuit split on private search doctrine for computers, WASH. POST 
(May 20, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/20/sixth-
circuit-creates-circuit-split-on-private-search-doctrine-for-computers/; Orin Kerr, 11th Circuit 
deepens the circuit split on applying the private search doctrine to computers, WASH. POST (Dec. 
2, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/12/02/11th-cir-
cuit-deepens-the-circuit-split-on-applying-the-private-search-doctrine-to-computers/.  
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is “What does it mean to exceed the scope of a private search of a 
digital device?” 
III. EXCEEDING THE SCOPE OF THE PRIVATE SEARCH: 
EXAMINING THE CONTAINER DISTINCTION 
United States v. Jacobsen was decided in 1984, prior to the real 
emergence of the digital age.63 In the 1980s and 1990s, cases in-
volving the private search doctrine examined scope questions 
largely related to searches of physical, non-digital forms of prop-
erty, not digital material.64 Throughout these two decades, juris-
prudence on the private search doctrine established the container 
distinction for determining when the government agent exceeded 
the scope of the initial private search.65 While the container dis-
tinction is appropriate in limiting searches of physical property, its 
principles are unsuitable as applied to digital devices. This section 
will outline the container distinction as applied to traditional, non-
digital forms of property and explain the suggested alternatives to 
applying the container distinction to digital devices, as created by 
Orin S. Kerr. 
 
 
A. Application of the Container Distinction to Traditional, Non-
Digital Forms of Property 
Traditionally, precedent regarding the Fourth Amendment 
has limited searches to discrete containers.66 In the physical, non-
                                                          
 63. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 111 (1984).  
 64. See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 111 (1984) (search of wrapped package); State v. Dold, 
44 Wash. App. 519, 521, 722 P.2d 1353, 1355 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986) (search of envelope); State 
v. Cline, 126 N.M. 77, 78, 966 P.2d 785, 786 (N.M. Ct. App. 1998) (search of zippered cosmetics 
pouch).  
 65. See generally HUBBART, supra note 31, at 340–46.  
 66. See generally id. 
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digital world, this distinction makes sense. A container is “an ob-
ject (such as a box or can) that can hold something.”67 Courts have 
conclusively decided “that a person has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in a container that he or she owns or possesses.”68 
As discussed in prior cases analyzing searches under the 
Fourth Amendment, “the opening of any closed containers . . . con-
stitutes a separate search.”69 Traditionally, it has been very easy 
to determine when privacy in a physical container has been vio-
lated: if the container has been opened, with its contents laid bare 
for the world to see, the expectation of privacy in that container 
has been violated.70 It is not until the container is opened that the 
person loses his or her expectation of privacy.71 
To illustrate the physical container distinction under the pri-
vate search doctrine, let’s assume the private searcher comes 
across a metal box with a lid, opens that box, and discovers mari-
juana and drug paraphernalia, stacks of cash, various clothing 
items and a notebook containing a ledger of accounts. When the 
private searcher lifts the lid on the metal box, any expectation of 
privacy the owner possessed in that box has been extinguished. 
This is because simply by lifting the lid and viewing the contents 
of the box, it becomes clear what the box contains. The government 
agent can proceed to search the box with a virtual certainty of what 
the box will contain. The government agent knows the box will con-
tain marijuana, drug paraphernalia, money, clothes, and a note-
book, simply because that is what the private searcher informed 
the government agent the box would contain. 
The government agent’s search of the metal box does not vio-
late the Fourth Amendment because the private searcher has al-
ready extinguished any expectation of privacy existing in the box 
and therefore, any subsequent search is not a “search” for purposes 
                                                          
 67. Container, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (2015), http://www.merriam-web-
ster.com/dictionary/container. 
 68. HUBBART, supra note 31, at 341.  
 69. Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 
554 (citing United States v. Block, 590 F.2d 535, 541 (4th Cir. 1978)). 
 70. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 117 (1984).  
 71. See id. 
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of the Fourth Amendment.72 The reason the subsequent search is 
not a Fourth Amendment “search” turns on the reasoning in Ja-
cobsen regarding the virtual certainty requirement. The physical 
container distinction works well for smaller containers, such as the 
metal box in the example above, because by opening the container, 
the private searcher and the subsequent government searcher 
know the contents of the container with virtual, if not absolute, 
certainty. However, as will be discussed in Part VI, infra, the phys-
ical container distinction does not apply well to larger spaces such 
as a shipping container or a house.73 This has prompted the courts 
to apply limitations to the private search doctrine in those in-
stances. 
These limitations arguably should be applied to digital devices 
as well because the virtual certainty requirement cannot possibly 
be satisfied as applied to a digital container. It is not automatically 
obvious upon opening the device, what the device will contain. 
Therefore, the physical container distinction is inappropriate as 
applied to digital containers. The question then becomes what is 
the appropriate test in determining permissible scope of searching 
digital devices. Orin S. Kerr sought to create a workable standard 
for searching digital devices, and so created the three zone theo-
ries.74 The rest of this section discusses the zone theories high-
lighted by Kerr. 
 
 
B. Application of the Container Distinction to Digital Devices: 
The Zone Theories 
As discussed above, the container theory comports well when 
the property at issue is a physical, discrete receptacle; however, 
                                                          
 72. See id. 
 73. See infra Part VI.  
 74. Kerr, supra note 17, at 554.  
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the container theory diverges in the digital world where the con-
tainers are not discrete objects but imaginary data. 
Orin S. Kerr explains this deviation well in his article entitled 
Searches and Seizures in a Digital World.75 Kerr suggests that ap-
plying traditional principles of searches in the physical world to 
the digital world can occur in accordance with three different op-
tions: (1) the zone of the initial search could be the physical storage 
device itself, (2) the zone of the initial search “could be defined by 
the contents of a virtual file,” or (3) the zone of the initial search 
could be the exposed data.76 Each of these individual search zones 
has singular implications on the scope of what a government agent 
is allowed to search following an initial private search under the 
private search doctrine. The zones will now be outlined in the order 
listed above. 
1. The Zone is the Physical Storage Device. 
The term physical storage device is somewhat confusing. It re-
fers to a tangible storage device which stores digital data. This type 
of device includes, but is not limited to, computers, cell phones, 
SIM cards, flash drives, “floppy” disks, hard drives, and CDs. The 
device itself is tangible, but the data it contains is intangible. 
Under the “zone is the device” theory, the digital search is not 
limited to files, folders, or exposed data.77 The physical storage de-
vice is the container, and the search of any information stored upon 
the device is permissible so long as the device itself has already 
been opened.78 For purposes of the private search doctrine this 
means if the private actor simply opened the device, even if he or 
she only viewed a single unit of data on the device, any subsequent 
search of the device’s entire data does not constitute an impermis-
sible search under the Fourth Amendment.79 If the physical stor-
age device is a computer, all the private searcher need do is open 
                                                          
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. See id. at 554–55. 
 78. See id. at 555 (citing United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449, 452–53 (5th Cir. 
2001)). 
 79. See id. 
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and turn on the computer and view any file on the device.80 If the 
physical storage device is a SIM card, flash drive, “floppy disk,” 
hard drive, or CD, all the private searcher need do is insert that 
device into a computer (or other instrument capable of reading the 
contents of the storage device), open it so that its contents are ca-
pable of being viewed, and view a single unit of data on the device.81 
If the search zone is defined as the device itself, opening the 
device and accessing just one file means the private searcher has 
searched the entire contents of the device and frustrated any pri-
vacy expectation of the device itself.82 This means any subsequent 
searches, even if not of the specific images or files originally 
searched by the private actor, do not exceed the scope of the private 
search doctrine.83 This zone definition is clearly the most permis-
sive of the three. The next most permissive zone definition is the 
“zone is the virtual folder” distinction. 
2. The Zone is the Virtual File 
Under the “zone is the virtual file” distinction, the digital 
search is limited to a virtual file, and only that virtual file.84 This 
file could be a document, image, or PDF for example. The file is the 
container for all intents and purposes. Opening the file means you 
have frustrated any expectation of privacy that existed within the 
file.85 
A good example of the virtual file approach exists in United 
States v. Lichtenberger. As will be discussed infra, Lichtenberger 
                                                          
 80. See Kerr, supra note 17, at 555.  
 81. See id. 
 82. See id. 
 83. See id. 
 84. See id. at 554–55. 
 85. See id. 
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involved a private search of the suspect’s computer, which was de-
termined to contain images of child pornography.86 Although the 
private searcher, in this case the suspect’s girlfriend, viewed im-
ages of child pornography on the device, upon turning the device 
over to law enforcement, the girlfriend was unable to say with cer-
tainty that the specific images she showed to the law enforcement 
agent were the same images she viewed during her private 
search.87 As a result, the Sixth Circuit determined the subsequent 
government search exceeded the scope of the private search.88 The 
court reasoned the agent’s viewing of additional files than those 
viewed during the private search was an impermissible extension 
of the private search because the suspect retained an expectation 
of privacy in the images not searched by the girlfriend.89 In so hold-
ing, the court created precedent for later courts to apply the “zone 
is the virtual file” distinction. 
The “zone is the virtual file” distinction is more restrictive 
than the “zone is the digital device” approach because it does not 
allow the government agent to search the entire device; rather, this 
approach limits the government agent to only searching the spe-
cific images or files already viewed by the private searcher.90 The 
virtual file distinction is, however, less restrictive than the “zone 
is the exposed data” approach because it allows the government 
agent to search the entire file or image and does not require the 
agent to limit his search to only the data shown on the output 
screen.91 
3. The Zone is the Exposed Data 
The last zone theory is the most restrictive of the three, and 
has not been adopted in any court to date. The “zone is the exposed 
data” theory limits the scope of the search to the information ap-
pearing on the output device (computer screen, cell phone screen, 
                                                          
 86. 86 F.3d 478, 480–81 (6th Cir. 2015). 
 87. Id. at 481.  
 88. Id. at 485.  
 89. Id. 
 90. See Kerr, supra note 17, at 554–56. 
 91. See id. at 555–57. 
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printer, etc.).92 The exposed data could be an individual image, an 
individual document, or even smaller subsets of these items such 
as a single page or part of a page within a document.93 The officers 
conducting the subsequent search of the device are limited to view-
ing specifically what the private searcher viewed down to the mi-
nute details of the data.94 
For example, if Sally views a document on Jeff’s computer that 
she believes contains evidence of Jeff’s fraudulent business trans-
actions, but Sally only views the first page of that document before 
handing the computer in to the FBI, the FBI agents investigating 
her tip are limited to viewing only the first page of the document 
Sally opened. These agents may not view any other page in this 
document, nor can they view any other image, document, file, or 
folder stored on the device itself. Under the “zone is the exposed 
data” approach, even scrolling down to see a different part of the 
same word processing file searched by the private actor constitutes 
a separate search under the Fourth Amendment, and if the officers 
did not first obtain a search warrant to do so, the search is in vio-
lation of the device owner’s Fourth Amendment rights.95 
The “zone is the virtual file” approach does not require this 
limitation and permits the agent to search the entire document. 
The “zone is the virtual file” approach, therefore, is a happy me-
dium between the three approaches outlined by Orin S. Kerr. As 
will be discussed infra, the virtual file approach is the approach 
that should be adopted in every private search doctrine case in-
volving searches of digital containers. This approach adequately 
balances the competing policy interests at stake and ensures the 
unwavering protection of Fourth Amendment rights. 
                                                          
 92. Id. at 556–57.  
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 557.  
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Although Kerr, the creator of the zone approaches, advocates 
for the exposed data approach,96 no court to date has adopted such 
a restrictive distinction. The courts that have addressed this issue 
are instead in contention over the first two approaches: the digital 
device approach and the virtual file approach.97 The next section of 
this comment will discuss the differing opinions regarding the 
proper approach to take in limiting the government search, specif-
ically discussing the major cases on each side of the divide. 
IV. APPLYING THE CONTAINER DISTINCTION IN THE 
DIGITAL WORLD: EXPLAINING THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
As mentioned above, the various United States Circuit Courts 
of Appeals are split on the issue of limiting the scope of the subse-
quent government search following the initial private search.98 The 
United States Circuit Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Seventh 
Circuits hold with the “zone is the device” theory and define the 
container as the physical storage device itself.99 For these two cir-
cuits, as long as the subsequent governmental search is confined 
to only the digital devices already opened by the private searcher, 
the governmental search is permissible.100 
The United States Circuit Courts of Appeals for the Sixth and 
Eleventh Circuits, on the other hand, hold with a theory limiting 
the search to the virtual file.101 The United States Circuit Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit arguably aligns with this approach 
                                                          
 96. Kerr, supra note 17, at 556 (“the better answer is to use the exposed information 
as the common denominator. The scope of a computer search should be whatever information 
appears on the output device . . .”).  
 97. United States v. Sparks, 806 F.3d 1323, 1330 (11th Cir. 2015) (cell phone); United 
States v. Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d 478, 479 (6th Cir. 2015) (computer); United States v. Tosti, 
733 F.3d 816, 818 (9th Cir. 2013) (computer); Rann v. Atchison, 689 F.3d 832, 833 (7th Cir. 
2012) (ZIP drive and camera memory card); United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449, 452 (5th 
Cir. 2001) (ZIP disks). 
 98. See Sparks, 806 F.3d at 1330; Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d at 479; Tosti, 733 F.3d at 
818; Rann, 689 F.3d at 833; Runyan, 275 F.3d at 452. 
 99. See Runyan, 275 F.3d at 452; Rann, 689 F.3d at 837.   
100. See Runyan, 275 F.3d at 452; Rann, 689 F.3d at 837.  
101. See Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d at 488; Sparks, 806 F.3d at 1336. 
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as well, as discussed in dicta in United States v. Tosti.102 These cir-
cuits hold that the permissible container is the individual image, 
document, file, etc.103 Within this restriction, the government agent 
is allowed to open and view the document, image, or file already 
seen by the private searcher, but is not allowed to open or view any 
other document, image, or file not already seen.104 These circuits 
adopt a middle-ground approach to defining the scope and ade-
quately balance the competing interests of furthering governmen-
tal investigation and protecting the privacy interests of citizens. As 
will become clear infra, this approach is the correct approach. 
The leading cases holding for the “zone is the virtual file” ap-
proach are United States v. Lichtenberger and United States v. 
Sparks, and through dicta, United States v. Tosti. The leading 
cases holding for the “zone is the digital device” approach are 
United States v. Runyan, and Rann v. Atchison. The latter cases 
will be discussed first. 
A. The View of the Fifth and Seventh Circuits: The Container 
Should be the Physical Storage Device 
The Fifth and Seventh Circuits hold in favor of limiting the 
scope of the government search, following the private search, to the 
physical storage device itself.105 This means that if the private 
searcher views even one image or file on the digital storage device, 
the device owner’s privacy interest in that device is frustrated.106 
Therefore, any subsequent search of the device does not exceed the 
scope of the private search, even if the subsequent search views 
additional, unviewed files and images.107 The first case to hold in 
favor of this approach was United States v. Runyan, a 2001 case 
                                                          
102. See Tosti, 733 F.3d at 822. 
103. See Runyan, 275 F.3d at 452; Rann, 689 F.3d at 837.   
104. See Runyan, 275 F.3d at 452; Rann, 689 F.3d at 837.  
105. Runyan, 275 F.3d at 452; Rann, 689 F.3d at 833.  
106. See Runyan, 275 F.3d at 452; Rann, 689 F.3d at 833. 
107. See Runyan, 275 F.3d at 452; Rann, 689 F.3d at 833. 
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published long before the Supreme Court addressed the unique pri-
vacy interests at stake in digital devices in Riley v. California.108 
1. United States v. Runyan 
United States v. Runyan established the “zone is the digital 
device” approach.109 The situation giving rise to the Fifth Circuit’s 
adoption of this approach was as follows: the defendant’s ex-wife 
confiscated a desktop computer and several floppy disks, ZIP disks, 
and CDS.110 After discovering that these devices contained images 
of child pornography, she turned the evidence over to the police.111 
The ex-wife only viewed some of the floppy disks and CDS, but did 
not view any of the ZIP disks.112 Law enforcement agents “exam-
ined several images from each disk and CD, including the ZIP 
disks.”113 Based on the results of this investigation “Runyan was 
indicted on six counts of child pornography charges.”114 
Following his arrest, Runyan moved to suppress all of the evi-
dence obtained against him, arguing that the warrantless searches 
of the disks were conducted in violation of the Fourth Amendment 
and therefore, any evidence obtained through these illegal 
searches had to be suppressed.115 Runyan argued the government 
search exceeded the private search because state and federal offi-
cials examined the ZIP disks, even though Runyan’s ex-wife had 
not.116 He also argued that agents “examined more images in re-
viewing each of these disks than did the private searchers.”117 
                                                          
108. Runyan, 275 F.3d at 452.  
109. See id.  
110. Id. at 453.  
111. Id.  
112. Id. 
113. Id. at 454 
114. Runyan, 275 F.3d at 455.  
115. Id. 
116. Id. at 460.  
117. Id. 
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The issue before the Fifth Circuit was whether a police search 
exceeds the scope of the private search when the police examine 
more items within a particular container than did the private 
searchers.118 In answering this question, the Fifth Circuit high-
lighted key language in United States v. Jacobsen — “the critical 
inquiry under the Fourth Amendment is whether the authorities 
obtained information with respect to which the defendant’s expec-
tation of privacy has not already been frustrated.”119 The Court re-
lied on the reasoning in Jacobsen which concluded that a police 
search is not problematic under the Fourth Amendment if the po-
lice “actions ‘enabled . . . [them] to learn nothing that had not pre-
viously been learned during the private search.’”120 The police had 
to be substantially certain of what the container would hold.121 The 
police could become substantially certain of the container’s con-
tents “based on the statements of the private searchers, their rep-
lication of the private search, and their expertise.”122 Based on this 
reasoning, the Fifth Circuit determined that the police search did, 
in fact, exceed the scope of the private search because the defend-
ant’s ex-wife did not search the ZIP disks at all.123 Runyan’s rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in the ZIP disks, therefore, still ex-
isted.124 
The pertinent part of Runyan, for purposes of investigating 
the digital container distinction, concerns the second argument 
given by the defendant — that the government search exceeded the 
scope of the private search doctrine because the police “examined 
                                                          
118. Id. at 456.  
119. Id. at 461.  
120. Runyan, 275 F.3d at 463 (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 446 U.S. 109, 120 
(1984)).   
121. Id. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. at 464 (“Indeed, [Judith] could not have known the contents of any of the ZIP 
disks, as she and Brandie did not use hardware capable of reading these disks in their private 
search.”). 
124. Id. 
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more files on each of the disks than did the private searchers.”125 
In response, the Fifth Circuit held that there was no constitutional 
issue when police examined more files than did the private 
searcher.126 The Fifth Circuit followed precedent established by 
United States v. Simpson127 which held law enforcement agents “do 
not exceed the scope of a prior private search when they examine 
the same materials that were examined by the private searchers, 
but they examine these materials more thoroughly than did the 
private parties.”128 The reason for this exception is the simple fact 
that the individual’s expectation of privacy in his property has al-
ready been frustrated by the private searcher; therefore, any sub-
sequent viewing of the container’s contents by the police does not 
constitute a “new ‘search’ for Fourth Amendment purposes.”129 
In essence, although not explicitly stated, the Runyan court 
viewed the “container,” for purposes of the private search doctrine, 
as the physical storage device itself, in this case CDs and a com-
puter.130 Once the defendant’s privacy interest has been frustrated 
in the container, anything on the device is fair game for police in-
vestigation and can be used as evidence to obtain a warrant or to 
arrest the defendant.131 
The Fifth Circuit identified the following policy reasons for its 
liberal definition of “container.” Using a “zone is the exposed data” 
or “zone is the file” approach would prevent the police from “engag-
ing in lawful investigation of containers where any reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy has already been eroded.”132 This would be a 
waste of time and resources.133 Also, police would waste time and 
resources attempting to obtain warrants based on the testimony of 
                                                          
125. Id. 
126. Runyan, 275 F.3d at 465. 
127. United States v. Simpson, 904 F.2d 607, 610 (11th Cir. 1990). 
128. Runyan, 275 F.3d at 464 (citing Simpson, 904 F.2d at 610). 
129. Id. at 465.  
130. See id. at 463–65. 
131. See id. 
132. Id. at 465.  
133. Id. 
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private searchers, which may or may not be reliable.134 An ap-
proach that does not allow the police to search the whole container 
following the private searcher’s opening of that container might: 
 . . . lead police to waste valuable time and resources obtain-
ing warrants based on intentionally false or misleading tes-
timony of private searchers, for fear that, in confirming the 
private testimony before obtaining a warrant, they would 
inadvertently violate the Fourth Amendment if they hap-
pened upon additional contraband that the private search-
ers did not see.135 
The key takeaway from the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning in 
Runyan is, for the sake of judicial expediency and conservation of 
law enforcement resources, police should be able to examine con-
tainers already searched by private individuals, even to a greater 
degree and intensity than previously executed.136 After all, the 
property owner’s expectation of privacy has already been frus-
trated anyway.137 Government agents do not exceed the scope of 
the private search when they view additional files on a device that 
has already been searched by the private individual, but they do 
exceed the scope of the private search if they view additional de-
vices not viewed by the private individual prior to the government 
search.138 This train of reasoning can also be found in a 7th Circuit 
case, Rann v. Atchison.139 
2. Rann v. Atchison 
Rann v. Atchison is the most recent case holding in favor of the 
“zone is the digital device” approach. The Seventh Circuit was 
                                                          
134. Runyan, 275 F.3d at 465. 
135. Id. 
136. See id. 
137. Id. 
138. Id. 
139. Rann v. Atchison, 689 F.3d 832, 833 (7th Cir. 2012).  
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called upon to decide if the police’s viewing of images not viewed 
by the private searcher was a “significant expansion of a private 
search such that a warrant was required to permit police to view 
the images.”140 The court ultimately concluded, following the Fifth 
Circuit’s reasoning in Runyan, the government search did not ex-
ceed the private search.141 
Steven Rann was convicted, in November 2006, of criminal 
sexual assault and possession of child pornography.142 Rann’s 
daughter reported him for sexual assault and turned in to the po-
lice, a digital camera memory card and a computer zip drive.143 
Rann argued that when police searched the submitted devices and 
viewed images stored upon them, they exceeded the scope of any 
private search previously conducted by the private party.144 Rann 
based this argument on the fact that no evidence was submitted 
showing that the private party had previously viewed the devices, 
nor that she “knew the digital storage devices contained images of 
child pornography prior to the police viewing.”145 Without this cer-
tainty, Rann contended, “police needed a warrant to ‘open’ the dig-
ital storage devices and search them . . ..”146 Without a warrant, 
the police search violated  Rann’s Fourth Amendment rights and 
any evidence obtained through the illegal search should be sup-
pressed.147 
Citing Jacobsen and Runyan, the court in Rann held police did 
not exceed the scope of the private search when they searched the 
disks.148 The officers in charge of this case could have been sub-
stantially certain, based on statements made by the private 
                                                          
140. Id. at 835. 
141. Id. at 838.  
142. Id. at 833.  
143. Id. at 834.  
144. Id. at 836.  
145. Rann, 689 F.3d at 836.  
146. Id. 
147. Id. 
148. Id. at 837.  
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searcher, what the disks contained.149 Additionally, the Rann court 
commented that “even if the police more thoroughly searched the 
digital media devices . . . the police search did not exceed or expand 
the scope of the initial private searches.”150 Once it could be deter-
mined that the reasonable expectation of privacy in the devices was 
frustrated by the private party, any evidence contained within the 
device was fair game for investigation.151 
Again, the Rann court viewed the “zone is the device” theory 
as the sensible approach when determining what it means to ex-
ceed the scope of the private search because the approach allegedly 
“preserves the competing objectives underlying the Fourth Amend-
ment’s protections against warrantless police searches.”152 The 
“zone is the device” theory keeps intact the defendant’s reasonably 
legitimate expectation of privacy until such time as that expecta-
tion of privacy is frustrated by the private search.153 When the frus-
tration occurs, the additional invasions of privacy are still tested 
in regards to the degree by which they exceed the scope of the pri-
vate search.154 However, the “zone is the device” theory also pro-
ceeds from the assumption that warrants are costly and time con-
suming for police to obtain.155 If the police are reasonably certain 
of what information the device will contain, based on the private 
search and their own expertise, and the suspect’s privacy has al-
ready been violated, what is the harm in viewing additional files?156 
As will be discussed in Part VI, infra, the reasoning supporting 
the Rann court’s decision to support the “zone is the digital device” 
approach is flawed.157 Warrants are not that costly and they are 
                                                          
149. Id.   
150. Id. at 838.  
151. See Rann, 689 F.3d at 838. 
152. Id. at 837.  
153. Id. 
154. Id. 
155. See United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449, 465 (5th Cir. 2001).  
156. See id. 
157. See infra Part VI.  
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much easier to obtain in the digital age. Additionally, the unique 
characteristics of digital devices, specifically the immense storage 
capabilities and the discrete types of information contained on 
these devices, requires a much more restrictive approach to defin-
ing the permissible scope of the government search. This restric-
tive approach can be seen in the post-Riley cases of United States 
v. Lichtenberger and United States v. Sparks in the Sixth and Elev-
enth Circuits, respectively, and the pre-Riley case of United States 
v. Tosti in the Ninth Circuit. The next section of this comment will 
discuss these cases in depth. 
B. The View of the Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits: The 
Container Should be the Virtual File 
The position of the Fifth and Seventh Circuits described above 
is flatly rejected by the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals for 
the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits.158 These courts believe the “zone 
is the device” theory exposes criminal defendants to too much ar-
bitrary governmental intrusion.159 Instead, these circuits believe 
the proper theory defining the scope of the private search should 
be the “zone is the virtual file” approach.160 The first circuit to hold 
in favor of the “zone is the virtual file” approach was the Sixth Cir-
cuit in United States v. Lichtenberger.161  
1. United States v. Lichtenberger 
In United States v. Lichtenberger, the United States Circuit 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit decided against the persua-
sive trend set by the Fifth and Seventh Circuits, holding that indi-
vidual files and images are separate “containers” and therefore, a 
subsequent government search of a digital storage device is limited 
to the individual files and images viewed by the private searcher.162 
Authorities arrested Aron Lichtenberger after his girlfriend dis-
covered images of child pornography on his laptop and showed 
                                                          
158. See United States v. Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d 478, 479 (6th Cir. 2015); United 
States v. Sparks, 806 F.3d 1323, 1333 (11th Cir. 2015). 
159. See Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d at 479; Sparks, 806 F.3d at 1333. 
160. See Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d at 479; Sparks, 806 F.3d at 1333. 
161. Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d at 485. 
162. Id. at 490–91. 
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some of the images to the police.163 Lichtenberger was charged with 
possession of child pornography; “before trial, Lichtenberger filed 
a motion to suppress the laptop evidence, which the district court 
granted.”164 
The district court granted Lichtenberger’s motion to suppress 
based on testimony from his girlfriend in which she admitted to 
viewing “approximately 100 images of child pornography saved in 
several subfolders inside a folder entitled ‘private.’”165 Lichten-
berger’s girlfriend could not identify which photographs she even-
tually presented to authorities, and could not say with certainty 
whether the images she presented to authorities were the exact 
images she viewed during her private search of Lichtenberger’s 
computer.166 The district court ruled authorities exceeded the scope 
of the private search because they viewed additional images not 
already seen through the private search.167 The Sixth Circuit re-
jected the government’s appeal.168 
Relying on United States v. Jacobsen, the court determined 
that a government actor exceeds the scope of the private search 
when he or she frustrates an expectation of privacy within the 
property that had not already been frustrated by the private ac-
tor.169 Pronouncing a largely political argument for its decision, the 
Sixth Circuit held the scope of the authorities’ “search of Lichten-
berger’s laptop exceeded that of Holmes’ private search conducted 
                                                          
163. Id. at 479.  
164. Id. at 480. 
165. Id. at 481.  
166. Id. 
 167. See Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d at 481. 
 168. Id. 
169. Id. at 485 (citing United States v. Jacobsen, 446 U.S. 109, 117–18 (1984)) (“The 
Fourth Amendment is implicated only if the authorities use information with respect to which 
the expectation of privacy has not already been frustrated. In such a case the authorities have 
not relied on what is in effect a private search, and therefore presumptively violate the Fourth 
Amendment if they act without a warrant.”).  
806 IDAHO LAW REVIEW VOL. 53 
 
earlier that day.”170 The court discussed what it termed the “critical 
measures” under the private search doctrine in regards to the 
scope of a permissible government search.171 These “critical 
measures” were: (1) how much information authorities were ex-
posed to upon re-examination of the device and (2) the certainty of 
the authorities regarding what they would likely find upon the de-
vice.172 
Adopting reasoning from the Supreme Court’s recent decision 
in Riley v. California, the court determined it would be inappropri-
ate to rely upon the traditional principles regarding searches of 
physical spaces and the items they contained in the context of dig-
ital spaces.173 The Sixth Circuit’s main reasoning for breaking from 
tradition was due to the immense storage capacity of modern digi-
tal devices.174 As the court noted, “the likelihood that an electronic 
device will contain 1) many kinds of data, 2) in vast amounts, and 
3) corresponding to a long swath of time, convinced the Riley court 
that officers must obtain a warrant before searching such a device 
incident to arrest.”175 That reasoning, in the eyes of the Sixth Cir-
cuit, applied just as convincingly to the private search doctrine as 
it did to the search incident to arrest exception.176 
The privacy interest in Lichtenberger’s property greatly out-
weighed any governmental interest in conducting the search.177 
The fundamental reason for this tip in the balance came down to 
virtual certainty, or lack thereof.178 As required by Jacobsen, in or-
der to stay within the scope of the private search, local authorities 
have to proceed with virtual certainty that they would not learn 
                                                          
 170. Id. at 485. 
171. Id.  
172. Id. at 485–86.  
173. Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d at 487.  
174. Id. 
175. Id. at 488 (citing Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2489 (2014)).  
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any new, private information from their subsequent search.179 Vir-
tual certainty is an impossibility with digital devices due to their 
unique capabilities.180 
As the court discussed, the government’s search of Lichten-
berger’s laptop could have revealed staggering amounts of Lichten-
berger’s private information “unrelated to the allegations prompt-
ing the search.”181 For example, the folders containing the images 
of child pornography just as easily could have contained “explicit 
photos of Lichtenberger himself,” “bank statements or personal 
communications,” “Lichtenberger’s medical history,” or even “his 
choice of restaurant.”182 These potential intrusions into Lichten-
berger’s private life could not possibly be justified, especially con-
sidering the governmental search lacked any of the “risks that sup-
port an immediate search.”183 The authorities’ safety was not 
threatened, Lichtenberger had already been arrested so “the im-
ages were not in danger of erasure, deterioration, or tampering,” 
and “the need to confirm the laptop’s contents on-site was not im-
mediate.”184 Due to “the strong privacy interests at stake, and the 
absence of threat to government interests,” the Sixth Circuit con-
cluded that the authorities’ search of Lichtenberger’s laptop did, in 
fact, violate Lichtenberger’s Fourth Amendment rights against 
warrantless searches.185 In doing so, the Sixth Circuit established 
conclusively that a government search which follows a private 
                                                          
179. Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d at 488.  
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search exceeds the scope of the private search when the govern-
ment searcher views additional files or images not viewed by the 
private actor.186 
In reaching its conclusion, the Sixth Circuit relied in part on 
reasoning established by the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Tosti.187 
2. United States v. Tosti 
Although United States v. Tosti did not conclusively decide 
that the “zone is the virtual file” approach is the correct approach 
when determining permissible scope, the court in this case did, 
through dicta, give the impression that it determined the proper 
approach is the virtual file approach.188 The police arrested the de-
fendant, Donald Thomas Tosti, after a computer technician at a 
CompUSA store discovered child pornography in a sub-folder on 
Tosti’s computer.189 At trial, Tosti moved to suppress the evidence 
obtained through the government’s search of his computer at the 
CompUSA store,190 arguing the search exceeded the scope of the 
private search because detectives viewed enlarged photographs in 
a slideshow format and scrolled through the thumbnail images, 
whereas the computer technician who conducted the initial search 
only viewed the thumbnail versions of the photos.191 The district 
court and the Ninth Circuit agreed that Tosti was not entitled to 
suppression on either of these bases.192 
The Ninth Circuit reasoned that pursuant to Jacobsen prece-
dent, the government search does not constitute a “search” for 
Fourth Amendment purposes if the reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in the property has already been extinguished by a private 
                                                          
186. Id. 
187. United States v. Tosti, 733 F.3d 816, 821 (9th Cir. 2013).  
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party.193 Scrolling through thumbnail photographs, which have al-
ready been exposed in their thumbnail form to a private actor, and 
enlarging those photographs does not constitute an additional in-
vasion of privacy.194 Even though he only viewed the photos in 
thumbnail form, the computer technician extinguished any reason-
able expectation of privacy Tosti had in the images.195 
Central to our discussion on the permissible scope of subse-
quent government searches of digital storage devices is the Ninth 
Circuit’s reasoning in relation to what the government agents did 
not do when they searched Tosti’s computer. As the court noted in 
Tosti, detectives did not view photos not already seen by the com-
puter technician.196 Likewise, “there was ‘no evidence in the record 
to suggest that either [d]etective . . . viewed any file folder or im-
ages other than the file folder and images opened by [the techni-
cian].” 197 This explicit statement by the court in support of its find-
ing that the detectives did not exceed the scope of the private 
search in this case seems to indicate that had the detectives viewed 
additional files on the device, the government search would have 
exceeded the private search. Additional support for this analysis 
comes from the fact that the Sixth Circuit, in deciding United 
States v. Lichtenberger, supported its decision by reference to the 
reasoning pronounced above by the Ninth Circuit in Tosti.198 
Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that on the issue of permis-
sible scope in warrantless searches of digital storage devices, the 
Ninth Circuit holds in favor of the virtual file theory. 
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The most recent decision weighing on this issue at the circuit 
court level is United States v. Sparks,199 an Eleventh Circuit case 
decided December 1, 2015.200 
3. United States v. Sparks 
United States v. Sparks tasked the Eleventh Circuit with de-
ciding what was a permissible warrantless search of a cell phone 
under the private search doctrine.201 Similar to the cases coming 
before it, United States v. Sparks was an appeal from convictions 
for possession and production of child pornography.202 Defendants 
Alan Robert Johnson and Jennifer A. Sparks left a cell phone con-
taining hundreds of images and videos of child pornography at a 
Walmart in Cape Coral, Florida.203 A Walmart employee showed 
the images on the cell phone to her husband, Widner, who brought 
the phone to the local authorities.204 Upon searching the phone, the 
local authorities viewed several images and two videos, one which 
was previously watched by Widner and one that had not been 
viewed during the private search.205 
Johnson and Sparks argued, in their respective motions to 
suppress, that the authorities’s viewing of the second unwatched 
video constituted an expansion of Widner’s private search; and 
therefore, a violation of their Fourth Amendment rights against 
unreasonable governmental search and seizure.206 The Eleventh 
Circuit agreed on this point.207 The court expressed “serious doubts 
that approving of the viewing of the second video when no private 
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party had first watched it would be consistent with the reasoning 
in Riley v. California.”208 
In light of the privacy concerns unique to digital devices, Wid-
ner’s private search of the cell phone could not possibly have extin-
guished all reasonable expectation of privacy in the device itself.209 
The court stated: 
While Widner’s private search of the cell phone might have 
removed certain information from the Fourth Amendment’s 
protections, it did not expose every part of the information 
contained in the cell phone. Here, no search warrant was 
obtained, and no exception to the search-warrant require-
ment excused [the detective’s] viewing of the second 
video.210 
Hence, the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Sparks, fur-
ther strengthened the support for a determination of permissible 
scope based on the actual images and files viewed by the private 
actor.211 In doing so, the court relied significantly on the reasoning 
espoused in Riley v. California.212 The Supreme Court’s reasoning 
in Riley lays the foundation for limiting searches of digital devices. 
The next part of this article discusses the Riley decision, highlight-
ing Chief Justice Roberts’s analysis regarding the unique peculiar-
ities of digital devices and the importance of protecting personal 
privacy. 
V. THE LEGACY OF RILEY V. CALIFORNIA: ADVOCATING 
FOR LIMITED GOVERNMENT INTRUSION ON PERSONAL 
PRIVACY RIGHTS IN DIGITAL DEVICES 
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Riley v. California was not a case involving the private search 
doctrine; rather, it dealt with the application of the Fourth Amend-
ment to digital devices through the search-incident-to-arrest ex-
ception.213 Despite the fact that Riley concerned a different Fourth 
Amendment exception, the policy reasoning encouraging digital 
device search limitations and the Court’s discussion of the privacy 
interests at stake informs our current issue. For that reason, this 
section will give an overview of the discussion in Riley, highlight-
ing specific points discussed by Chief Justice Roberts concerning 
the proliferation and unique attributes of digital devices and the 
importance of limiting warrantless access to these devices. 
The search-incident-to-arrest exception essentially allows “the 
Government . . . to search the person of the accused when legally 
arrested to discover and seize the fruits or evidences of crimes.”214 
This exception is certainly different from the private search doc-
trine because it involves actions initiated by government agents, 
not private individuals, and it exists primarily to recognize “con-
cerns for officer safety and evidence preservation.”215 However, the 
two exceptions are similar in that they concern the reasonableness 
of warrantless searches. It is the reasonableness point that was at 
issue in Riley216 and that is at issue in our discussion of private 
search doctrine cases. Therefore, the Court’s reasoning in Riley is 
informative of how the Court likely would and should define the 
scope of a permissible subsequent search of a digital device by a 
government agent in private search doctrine cases. 
Chief Justice Roberts began by examining the singular char-
acteristics of modern digital devices (particularly cellular “smart” 
phones).217 In the words of Chief Justice Roberts, “modern cell 
phones . . . are now such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life 
that the proverbial visitor from Mars might conclude they were an 
important feature of human anatomy.”218 Roberts noted that even 
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less sophisticated phones, which are increasingly becoming obso-
lete, are “based on technology nearly inconceivable just a few dec-
ades ago.”219 Denouncing the United States’s argument “that a 
search of all data stored on a cell phone is ‘materially indistin-
guishable’ from searches of these sorts of physical items.” Roberts 
pronounced that modern devices, as a whole, “implicate privacy 
concerns far beyond those implicated by the search of [a physical 
container].”220 
Cell phones contain immense storage capacity.221 The stand-
ard model of the top-selling smart phone, at the time of the Riley 
decision, was sixteen (16) gigabytes.222 “Sixteen gigabytes trans-
lates to millions of pages of text, thousands of pictures, or hundreds 
of videos.”223 Additionally, cell phones have the capability of storing 
many distinct types of information, such as “photographs, picture 
messages, text messages, internet browsing history, a calendar, a 
thousand-entry phone book, and so on.”224 
Chief Justice Roberts highlighted four interrelated conse-
quences on personal privacy as a result of the increasing storage 
capacity of cell phones (as well as other digital devices).225 First, a 
cell phone is a repository for numerous distinct forms of infor-
mation, including but not limited to notes, addresses, prescrip-
tions, videos, and bank or credit statements, which may “reveal 
much more in combination than any isolated record.”226 Second: 
A cell phone’s capacity allows even just one type of infor-
mation to convey far more than previously possible. The 
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sum of an individual’s private life can be reconstructed 
through a thousand photographs labeled with dates, loca-
tions, and descriptions; the same cannot be said of a photo-
graph or two of loved ones tucked into a wallet.227 
Third, unless the device’s owner sets the device to automati-
cally delete information after a certain period of time, devices ac-
cumulate unending stores of information, which “can date back to 
the purchase of the [device], or even earlier.”228 It is not uncommon 
for individuals to retain the same device for years at a time before 
upgrading to a new model, which means that a person’s communi-
cation with people in his life can be recorded and stored for weeks, 
months, or years.229 In contrast, a person is very unlikely to record 
all the face-to-face conversations he has with others and take those 
communications with him wherever he goes.230 Finally, cell phone 
use is exceedingly pervasive.231 “Prior to the digital age, people did 
not typically carry a cache of sensitive personal information with 
them as they went about their day.”232 “Now it is the person who is 
not carrying a cell phone, with all that it contains, who is the ex-
ception.”233 Roberts highlighted a further complication on the scope 
of the privacy interests at stake by noting the existence of cloud 
computing, “the capacity of Internet-connected devices to display 
data stored on remote servers rather than on the device itself.”234 
The existence of cloud computing creates the issue that the govern-
ment agent’s search is not limited to just what is on the device.235 
The above policy implications convinced the Supreme Court to 
significantly limit warrantless searches of digital devices, even if 
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conducted through a legitimate exception to the Fourth Amend-
ment.236 Chief Justice Roberts concluded his opinion with the recog-
nition that the Court’s decision would have a great “impact on the 
ability of law enforcement to combat crime.”237 Roberts recognized 
that cell phones (and other digital devices) “have become important 
tools in facilitating coordination and communication among mem-
bers of criminal enterprises, and can provide valuable incriminat-
ing information about dangerous criminals.”238 Roberts noted, how-
ever, that “[p]rivacy comes at a cost,”239 and if the police want to 
search the digital device, they can, but first, they must obtain a 
warrant.240 
The conclusion that police should be able to search an entire 
digital device following the private search is quite clearly at odds 
with the Supreme Court’s current view of privacy rights in digital 
devices. As the following section will make clear, it is the virtual 
file approach, not the digital device approach, that preserves the 
privacy protections our Founders fought so hard to obtain, and for 
that reason, it is the correct approach for all courts in this nation 
to adopt. 
VI. WHY LIMITING THE SCOPE OF THE PERMISSIBLE 
GOVERNMENTAL SEARCH TO THE INDIVIDUAL IMAGE OR 
FILE IS THE CORRECT APPROACH: ANALYZING THE 
POLICY INTERESTS AT STAKE 
As Lichtenberger, Tosti, and Sparks make clear, applying the 
traditional test for determining what it means to exceed the scope 
of a private search, as applied to physical, tangible containers, is 
inappropriate for outlining a permissible search of a digital con-
tainer. Digital containers differ from physical containers in 
marked ways. This point was evidenced in the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Riley v. California, discussed in the previous section. 
Although the government has expressed some important policy 
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reasons, such as the danger of evidence destruction and the con-
siderable resources expended to obtain search warrants, these rea-
sons are substantially outweighed by: (1) the intent of the Found-
ing Fathers and the ratifying generation in passing the Fourth 
Amendment, (2) the nature and pervasive use of digital devices 
themselves, and (3) the impossibility of virtual certainty regarding 
the contents of digital containers. This section will consider the 
main arguments posed by the Fifth and Seventh Circuits in sup-
port of the digital device approach and explain why these argu-
ments are flawed. Then, this section will discuss the main argu-
ments in favor of the virtual file approach, and ultimately conclude 
that these arguments prevail. 
A. The Arguments for Adopting the Digital Device Approach & 
Why Such a Permissive Approach is Unwarranted 
As outlined above, the primary reasons extended by the Fifth 
Circuit in United States v. Runyan to support it’s holding in favor 
of the “zone is the digital device” approach included the unneces-
sary and significant judicial costs in obtaining warrants and the 
fact that the government agent could already be virtually certain 
of what the device contained due to the description of the contents 
by the private searcher.241 Another argument that could arguably 
be extended in favor of adopting the “zone is the digital device” ap-
proach is to prevent destruction of evidence through modern data 
destruction techniques. These arguments will be discussed in this 
section, and ultimately rejected. 
1. Preventing Destruction of Evidence 
One argument that could be extended in support of allowing 
the government agent to search the entire digital device, even if 
the private searcher did not do so, is the danger that, through mod-
ern data destruction technologies, the pertinent evidence of crimi-
nal activity might be deleted from the device prior to the govern-
ment agent’s being able to obtain a warrant. This is a potential 
problem because in many of the cases involving the private search 
doctrine, the private searcher personally knows the owner of the 
property.242 The personal relationship between the private 
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searcher and the alleged criminal/owner of the property can have 
problematic consequences on the government’s search of the prop-
erty. If the private searcher tips off the suspect, even unintention-
ally, as to the government confiscation of property, prior to the gov-
ernment agent being able to obtain a warrant to search the rest of 
the device, the suspect could wipe the device or encrypt it so the 
data cannot be accessed.243 This is a process known as remote wip-
ing.244 
Remote wiping is “a security feature that allows a network ad-
ministrator or device owner to send a command to a computing de-
vice and delete data.”245 If a computer or other device is connected 
to the Internet and the device’s owner is sophisticated enough in 
computer technology, the owner could remotely access the com-
puter with the object of removing any incriminating data upon the 
device before that data could be used against the owner.246 “A re-
mote wipe may delete data in selected folders, repeatedly overwrite 
stored data to prevent forensic recovery, return the device to fac-
tory settings or remove all programming on the device, essentially 
turning it into a brick, meaning that it is no longer of any use to 
anyone.”247 
According to an article published by CNN, remote wiping tech-
nology will become a standard addition to all phones produced by 
                                                          
2012) (private searcher was defendant’s biological daughter and the daughter’s mother); 
United States v. Tosti, 733 F.3d 816, 819 (9th Cir. 2013) (additional documents, hard drives, a 
computer, and DVDs were turned over to police by defendant’s estranged wife); United States 
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243. Zack Whittaker, Smartphones ‘remotely wiped’ in police custody, as encryption vs. 
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major players in the mobile phone world.248 “Apple, Google, Sam-
sung and Microsoft, along with the five biggest cellular carriers in 
the United States, are among those that have signed on to a volun-
tary program.”249 This voluntary program requires all smartphones 
manufactured in the United States after July 2015 to have remote 
wiping technology.250 The feature is designed to deter smartphone 
theft, a growing problem in the United States, but it has the added 
consequence of allowing users to remotely wipe their digital de-
vices should those devices fall into the wrong hands, even the 
hands of law enforcement.251 The “kill switch” would allow device 
owners to “erase contacts, photos, e-mail and other information, 
and lock the phone so it can’t be used without a password.”252 
Remote wiping is a particular problem in the time period after 
the private actor has turned the device into the police and the po-
lice have verified that the device contains criminal material but 
before the police are able to obtain a search warrant to view the 
rest of the device’s contents. During that limbo period, the device 
owner could, theoretically, remotely wipe the device and destroy 
any evidence of criminal or illegal activity. This exact problem has 
occurred in the United Kingdom.253 
In 2014, British police forces encountered at least six individ-
ual instances of smartphones being remotely wiped after being 
seized by police.254 This remote wiping activity purportedly de-
stroyed “vital evidence as part of ongoing investigations.”255 It does 
not take a long amount of time to send a signal to the mobile device 
so “even that short period of time after a device has been seized can 
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be enough to send through a remotely-activated data kill switch.”256 
There does not seem to be any evidence of police forces in the 
United States encountering the same issues as British police 
forces, but as time goes on, the potential problems created by re-
mote wiping technology could increase as people, especially those 
with something to hide, become more aware of the technology and 
well versed in its applications. 
Another potential technological advancement that could con-
tribute to the destruction of evidence in pre-warrant situations is 
a process known as geofencing. Geofencing is a subset of remote 
wiping; it is a process by which a device is “configured to automat-
ically wipe all data when the GPS in the device determines that it 
has left (or entered) a specific predetermined geographic area. This 
method may also employ WiFi towers for location determination as 
well.”257 Theoretically, geofencing technology could be used by 
criminals to lock down and/or remotely wipe digital devices that 
come within a certain distance to a police station. In that sense, if 
the police confiscate the device from the private searcher and take 
that device to their headquarters, the act of entering the predeter-
mined GPS coordinates could trigger the digital device to destroy 
its contents. 
The technologies of remote wiping and geofencing could lend 
support to the “zone is the physical device” theory supported by the 
Fifth and Seventh Circuits. One could argue that the government 
should be able to view the entire contents of a digital device for 
evidence of criminal activity if there is a substantial risk of those 
contents being erased before the government can obtain a search 
warrant. If the device is erased before the search warrant is 
granted, the government is effectively unable to prosecute individ-
uals for criminal activity, despite strong evidence of illegal ac-
tions.258 
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This argument is almost flatly rejected by the Supreme Court 
in Riley v. California.259 As Chief Justice Roberts pointed out, in 
his Riley opinion, law enforcement has means to address the prob-
lem of remote wiping.260 For example, officers could simply turn the 
phone or other device off or remove the device’s battery so it cannot 
connect to a network.261 Additionally, David Bennett suggests two 
other ways officers could ensure the device is unable to be remotely 
accessed: use of a Faraday bag and use of a radio frequency 
shielded test enclosure box.262 
A Faraday bag is a plastic-coated, radio frequency (RF) 
shielded bag “used to shield a mobile device from external con-
tact.”263 If the device is placed in a Faraday bag, it cannot reach a 
wireless signal, thereby making remote wiping or geofencing an 
impossibility as long as the device remains in the bag.264 A radio 
frequency shielded test enclosure box is similar to the Faraday bag 
in that it isolates the device from the cellular network.265 This pre-
vents communication with the device, including GPS communica-
tion.266 
In addition to the use of practical, network limiting technolo-
gies, there exists a judicial remedy to allow government agents to 
conduct searches if they have a reasonable fear of destruction of 
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evidence.267 This remedy is known as a search under exigent cir-
cumstances, also known as the exigency doctrine.268 The exigency 
doctrine, as applied to Fourth Amendment searches and seizures, 
allows the needs of law enforcement to compel a warrantless 
search based on objectively reasonable determinations.269 An objec-
tively reasonable determination could be found in cases where 
there is a need to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence.270 
Government agents, in such a situation, are justified in circum-
venting the Fourth Amendment “by the existence of exigent cir-
cumstances [requiring] the officer to act immediately without [a] 
warrant or consent.”271 
The exigency doctrine is not a savings provision; it is very 
much the exception to the general rule.272 In the typical case, gov-
ernment agents will not be justified by the exigency doctrine in 
searching the entire device. Government agents should only be per-
mitted to invoke the exigency doctrine when there is a real danger 
that the evidence contained on the device will be imminently de-
stroyed before the agents can obtain a warrant to search the entire 
device. Only in these situations will it be objectively reasonable for 
the government agents to be permitted to violate the suspect’s 
Fourth Amendment rights. While destruction of evidence in spe-
cific cases may support a finding of exigency, it should not do so 
categorically, and the prevailing test for determining permissible 
scope should be the “zone is the virtual file” approach. 
Even though it is important for government agents to be per-
mitted to search devices for incriminating material, government 
agents should not be permitted to circumvent well-established 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to do so. With the use of tech-
nologies such as the Faraday bag, increased governmental intru-
sion in regards to permitting law enforcement to search an entire 
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digital device in excess of a private search is not justified. Law en-
forcement agencies have the capabilities to preserve digital evi-
dence until warrants can be obtained; therefore, these agencies 
should not be permitted to trample upon defendants’ Fourth 
Amendment rights. Even in situations where law enforcement 
agencies may lack such technologies as Faraday bags or radio fre-
quency shielded test enclosure boxes, they can always simply 
power down the device so it cannot connect to a WiFi or cellular 
network. Additionally, in very rare circumstances, the exigency 
doctrine exists to save vital evidence from the risk of true destruc-
tion. With these alternatives, adoption of the “zone is the digital 
device” theory is unnecessary. 
2. Avoiding Unnecessary Judicial and Law Enforcement Costs 
Another argument in support of allowing government law en-
forcement agencies to search the whole digital device as permitted 
by the Fifth and Seventh Circuits is the idea that requiring a war-
rant to search devices for which the expectation of privacy has ar-
guably already been frustrated by the private actor and which con-
tain criminal activity is a waste of judicial time and resources.273 In 
essence, this argument pronounces that law enforcement agents 
should be able to view the entire contents of the device because 
they can be virtually certain that the device contains criminal ac-
tivity. This virtual certainty is accomplished by the fact that the 
law enforcement agents have already viewed illegal activity on the 
device, the evidence offered by the private actor. 
This argument is flawed for the following reasons. First, as 
will be discussed in the next section, the unique characteristics of 
digital devices make the virtual certainty requirement of Jacobsen 
a pragmatic impossibility.  Even if agents could be certain that the 
device contains images of child pornography or evidence of finan-
cial fraud, for example, the agents could not be certain of what else 
the device could contain. Digital devices have immense storage ca-
pacity and the capability of holding numerous discrete forms of in-
formation. The only virtual certainty an agent could possibly have 
in the digital device is that the specific file or image viewed con-
tains illegal activity. This virtual certainty only exists in the spe-
cific file or image viewed. It does not exist for the rest of the device.  
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Second, while the resources of law enforcement agencies and 
the judiciary are of important consideration, concerns of depleting 
resources should not be enough to overcome the strong constitu-
tional protections of the Fourth Amendment. The Fifth Circuit rea-
sons, in United States v. Runyan, that warrants are costly and time 
consuming to obtain.274 While this may have been true when 
Runyan was decided in 2001, the Supreme Court case of Missouri 
v. McNeely,275 makes clear that technological advancements in the 
warrant application process have made obtaining warrants 
quicker and much less costly.276 As amended, the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure allow warrants to be issued by telephone or 
other electronic means.277 Additionally, “well over a majority of 
States allow police officers or prosecutors to apply for search war-
rants remotely through various means, including telephonic or ra-
dio communication, electronic communication such as e-mail, and 
video conferencing.”278 States have also streamlined the warrant 
process by using standard forms for certain applications.279 
While telecommunications innovations have not, by any 
means, “eliminate[d] all delay from the warrant-application pro-
cess,”280 they have enabled law enforcement agents to obtain war-
rants through a quicker and more streamlined process.281 For that 
reason, the argument in favor of allowing law enforcement agents 
the ability to search the whole device fails. The unique character-
istics of digital devices and the inherent potential for abuse in al-
lowing law enforcement wide discretion and latitude counsel 
against the adoption of the “zone is the digital device” theory. Only 
the “zone is the virtual file” approach accurately and adequately 
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takes into account the competing interests at stake in digital device 
searches.  
B. The Arguments for Adopting the Virtual File Approach & Why 
Such a Limited Approach is Desirable 
The virtual file theory acknowledges technological advance-
ments in digital devices, advancements in the jurisprudential sys-
tem and the unwavering intent of the Founding Fathers in passing 
the Fourth Amendment. For that reason, it is the proper approach 
to be taken in determining permissible scope. This section will dis-
cuss the important policy arguments in support of the virtual file 
approach. 
1. The Intent of the Founding Fathers and the Ratifying 
Generation in the Passage of the Fourth Amendment 
The “zone is the virtual file” approach adopted by the Sixth 
and Eleventh Circuits comports most accurately and completely 
with the intent of the Founding Fathers in the passage of the 
Fourth Amendment. This section will give some historical back-
ground on the passage of the Fourth Amendment, specifically 
showing how the Fourth Amendment was passed to ensure ade-
quate safeguards were implemented to prevent the creation of a 
police state. It will also discuss how allowing the “zone is the digital 
device” approach is contrary to the intentions of the Founding Fa-
thers, which were to require specificity and concrete limitations to 
unchecked and arbitrary governmental intrusion on private citizen 
life. 
The Fourth Amendment was placed in the Constitution by our 
Founding Fathers and the ratifying generation in response to the 
fear of allowing searches and seizures of a person’s property and 
home without probable cause.282 In Great Britain, in the early to 
mid 1700s, searches without probable cause were commonplace, 
and “general warrants allowed the Crown’s messengers to search 
without any cause to believe someone had committed an offense.”283 
Perhaps the most prolific example of the unchecked power of the 
British government to invade the privacy of its citizens through 
general warrants was the case of John Wilkes, a member of the 
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British Parliament and staunch critic of the expansive and unbri-
dled policies of the government.284 
In 1762, Wilkes published an anonymous series of pamphlets 
which criticized the search and seizure policies of the British gov-
ernment.285 Embittered with the constant and increasingly adverse 
critique of its administration, the British government launched an 
attack against the authors of these pamphlets, the identities of 
whom were unknown by the government at the time.286 The Secre-
tary of State, Lord Halifax, issued a general warrant of arrest to 
four individuals, “ordering them to make strict and diligent search 
for the authors, printers, and publishers of a seditious and trea-
sonable paper . . . and them, or any of them, having found, to ap-
prehend and seize, together with their papers.”287 
The problem with this warrant was its lack of specificity.288 As 
discussed by Nelson B. Lasson in his book examining the early 
background development of the Fourth Amendment, Halifax’s war-
rant was so general “as to the persons to be arrested and the places 
to be searched and the papers to be seized” that “probable cause 
upon oath could necessarily have no place in it since the very ques-
tions as to whom the messengers should arrest, where they should 
search, and what they should seize, were given over into their ab-
solute discretion.”289 
Imbued with the authority of the general warrant, the four 
messengers proceeded to arrest forty-nine individuals in three 
days upon simple suspicion of seditious activity, oftentimes taking 
individuals from their beds during the night.290 After apprehending 
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the actual printer of the pamphlets, the messengers learned that 
Wilkes was the author, arrested him, and removed all of Wilkes’s 
private papers from his home.291 Wilkes and the other printers ar-
rested brought suit against the British government for false im-
prisonment.292 Chief Justice Pratt declared the general warrant to 
be illegal and a gross abuse of power by the Secretary of State.293 
The Chief Justice stated: 
The defendants claimed a right under precedents to force 
persons’ houses, break open escritoires, seize their papers, 
upon a general warrant, where no inventory is made of the 
things taken away, and where no offenders’ names are spec-
ified in the warrant, and therefore a discretionary power 
given to messengers to search wherever their suspicions 
may chance to fall. If such a power is truly invested in a 
secretary of state, and he can delegate this power, it cer-
tainly may affect the person and property of every man in 
this kingdom, and is totally subversive of the liberty of the 
subject.294 
In the aftermath of the American revolution, the newly inde-
pendent Americans decided to break from British tradition and 
placed “the right against unreasonable search and seizure on a con-
stitutional footing.”295 The many state constitutions in the emerg-
ing United States of America not only disallowed general warrants; 
“they also elevated specific warrants, probable cause, and the idea 
of unreasonable search and seizure to the position of higher law.”296 
With the memory of the Wilkes case and the language of thirteen 
state constitutions in mind, Congress passed the Fourth Amend-
ment as part of the Bill of Rights on September 25th, 1789.297 The 
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ultimate goal of the Fourth Amendment is to “protect people’s right 
to privacy and freedom from arbitrary governmental intrusions.”298 
This goal reflects the familiar maxim that “a man’s home is his 
castle,” and “makes plain . . . that the Constitution does not toler-
ate the tactics of a police state.”299 
The history and jurisprudence of the Fourth Amendment in-
form this issue of permissible scope of the subsequent government 
search in at least a couple ways. First, connections can be made 
between a digital storage device and a house, such that the special 
protections regarding “a man’s castle” and the unique limitations 
of the private search doctrine as applied to residences work to limit 
the permissible scope of the subsequent government search to the 
virtual files searched by the private actor. Second, the prohibition 
against general warrants discussed above and the unwavering de-
sire for specificity in Fourth Amendment applications mandate a 
virtual file approach and reject the digital device approach. 
a. Similarities Between Digital Devices and Houses 
A digital storage device is not unlike a house. In essence, a 
digital storage device contains many of the same things as a house 
might contain – photos, cameras, videos, video players, libraries, 
diaries, albums, televisions, maps, newspapers, etc. A digital stor-
age device is essentially a house for your consciousness; it stores 
many of your thoughts, your concerns, your dreams, and your 
doubts. It can very well be described as a “sanctuary” for those 
thoughts, and as such is deserving of special protection. 
In Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the house has received 
such special protection.300 “Indeed, the physical entry into the home 
has been described as the ‘chief evil against which the wording of 
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the Fourth Amendment is directed.’”301 It has been pronounced 
that “a sane, decent, civilized society must provide some such oasis, 
some shelter from public scrutiny, some insulated enclosure, some 
enclave, some inviolate place which is a man’s castle.”302 
The home receives special protection as well under the private 
search doctrine. As the Sixth Circuit decided in United States v. 
Allen,303 the private search doctrine does not apply to searches of 
residences.304 A person’s expectation of privacy is not extinguished 
if a private actor searches the person’s residence.305 The person still 
has an expectation of privacy in the contents of his residence.306 If 
a government agent, upon information from the private searcher, 
opens containers within the home not opened by the private 
searcher, the government agent has violated the person’s Fourth 
Amendment rights.307 Simply by searching the house generally, the 
private actor does not destroy the expectation of privacy specifi-
cally.308 
The residence protection applies well to the subject of digital 
storage devices. As discussed above, digital storage devices are suf-
ficiently similar to houses to be subject to the same Fourth Amend-
ment policy protections. In fact, Chief Justice Roberts in his Riley 
opinion noted this very problem and said: 
Indeed, a cell phone search would typically expose to the 
government far more than the most exhaustive search of a 
house: A phone not only contains in digital form many sen-
sitive records previously found in the home; it also contains 
a broad array of private information never found in a home 
in any form—unless the phone is.309 
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In applying the principles regarding physical searches of resi-
dences to digital containers, it becomes clear that the proper ap-
proach to determining the scope of a permissible governmental 
search is the virtual file approach. In essence, the digital device is 
the home and any file, image, or document contained upon the de-
vice can be analogized to a box or container within the home. In 
order to open additional files, images, or documents on the device, 
those files, images, or documents must first have been opened by 
the private actor. As the world becomes increasingly digital, with 
more and more activity done online rather than in reality, this com-
parison only becomes more concrete. 
b. The Prohibition Against Lack of Specificity Mandates a Virtual 
File Approach. 
As the Wilkes case, discussed supra, makes clear, specificity in 
warrant applications and in searches and seizures is a must, not a 
suggestion. The Supreme Court in Jacobsen picked up on this man-
date of specificity in its requirement of virtual certainty in appli-
cation of the private search doctrine. But, as will be discussed in-
fra, is it even possible to have virtual certainty regarding the con-
tents of a digital device, without first searching every last piece of 
data on the device? 
Digital devices have an inherent lack of specificity in regards 
to knowing the contents of the device and being able to pinpoint 
with virtual certainty the allegedly criminal material. It is very 
improbable that a person’s entire digital device will only contain 
criminal material. It is much more likely that the device will con-
tain anything and everything from pictures to e-books, videos to 
addresses, medical records to diary entries. As Jacobsen pro-
nounced, the critical measures in determining whether the govern-
ment search exceeds the scope of the private search are how much 
private information the government stands to gain when it re-ex-
amines the evidence and how certain it is regarding what it will 
find.310 
If the government agent is permitted to use the “zone is the 
digital device” approach, the agent stands to gain every piece of 
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information ever viewed or downloaded on the device. The govern-
ment agent cannot possibly be certain that every piece of infor-
mation on the device will contain criminal material. The govern-
ment agent cannot even be virtually certain that every piece of in-
formation on the device will contain criminal material. For that 
reason, the “zone is the digital device” theory goes against every 
limitation in Jacobsen and against everything the Fourth Amend-
ment was passed to prevent. Permitting the government agent to 
search every file, image, or document on a suspect’s private device, 
without first obtaining a warrant, is akin to allowing government 
agents to ransack every container within a person’s home for evi-
dence of alleged criminal activity, an action clearly outlawed by the 
Wilkes decision and numerous decisions following. 
Chief Justice Pratt, in the quoted language discussed supra, 
established that to allow a government agent to search wherever 
his “suspicions may chance to fall” would be to allow an act so sub-
versive to liberty that it would go against every protection we have 
against unreasonable search and seizure.311 The digital device ap-
proach allows the government agent to search the entire device, 
wherever his suspicions may chance to fall. Only the virtual file 
approach and the exposed data approach impose limitations on 
this broad and virtually unchecked power. Of course, it becomes a 
different question when the government agent has obtained a war-
rant and is searching a digital device upon the authority of that 
warrant. In that case, as long as the warrant is specific and lawful, 
the reasons for limiting government searches of digital devices be-
come less convincing. In private search doctrine cases, however, 
the government agents are proceeding without a warrant; as such, 
their actions in searching digital devices should be limited. 
Warrants present limitations on the power of law enforce-
ment. When abolishing the warrant requirement, the judiciary 
should be very careful to preserve the important privacy interests 
of citizens. To allow the agents to search the whole device, without 
a warrant, simply because a private actor viewed one, single file on 
the device is to provide too broad a license of investigation and sus-
picion. The virtual file approach presents a needed limitation on 
the powers of law enforcement, and thus should be the approach 
adopted in private search doctrine cases where the evidence at is-
sue is a digital device. 
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2. The Nature and Pervasive Use of Digital Devices 
Digital devices present unique attributes that distinguish 
them from physical containers. Cell phones (and other digital de-
vices) have immense storage capacity. Cell phones, alone, can act 
as “cameras, video players, rolodexes, calendars, tape recorders, li-
braries, diaries, albums, televisions, maps, or newspapers.”312 Be-
fore the advent of modern digital devices, a search was limited by 
the fact that most people couldn’t, and even if they could likely 
wouldn’t, carry “every piece of mail they have received for the past 
several months, every picture they have taken, or every book or 
article they have read . . . .”313 Digital devices make this physical 
impossibility not only possible but also quite probable and make 
prior search limitations inapplicable. The resulting possible intru-
sion on privacy interests for digital devices is not physically limited 
in the same way a possible intrusion on privacy interests for phys-
ical devices is. 
As Chief Justice Roberts pointed out in Riley, “the current top-
selling smart phone has a standard capacity of 16 gigabytes (and 
is available with up to 64 gigabytes). Sixteen gigabytes translates 
to millions of pages of text, thousands of pictures, or hundreds of 
videos.”314 Even basic phones without such capacity have the abil-
ity to hold text and picture messages, a person’s calendar and 
schedule, thousands of personal contacts, photographs, and for 
those phones with network capabilities, an Internet browsing his-
tory.315 
In the short time since Riley was passed, the computer tech-
nology market has expanded even further than sixteen gigabyte 
standard models. In fact, Samsung is introducing a sixteen terabyte 
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model to the consumer hard drive market sometime in 2016.316 Six-
teen terabytes translates to roughly 272,000 hours of music, 16,000 
hours of video, or 4,960,000 photos.317 With the constantly chang-
ing nature of the digital technology market, it is not inconceivable 
to conclude that this storage capacity will continue to increase for 
years to come. 
The problem is compounded when you consider the pervasive-
ness of digital devices. Cell phones, and other devices “are now 
such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life that the proverbial 
visitor from Mars might conclude they were an important feature 
of human anatomy. A smart phone . . . was unheard of ten years 
ago; a significant majority . . . now own such phones.”318 In fact, a 
study conducted in 2015 regarding smartphone usage in the 
United States revealed that “64% of American adults own a 
smartphone of some kind.”319 The percentage increases to 85% 
among young adults.320 
Especially concerning for our purposes is the quality of the in-
formation accessed on digital devices. Smartphones are much more 
than the typical telephone of yesteryear in that they are used for 
more than just to call and text people.321 According to the PEW Re-
search Center survey, a significant number of adult smartphone 
owners used their phones during the year to “look up information 
about a health condition” (62%), participate in online banking 
(57%), “look up real estate listings” (44%), search for job infor-
mation (43%), search for government services (40%), “take a class 
or get educational content” (30%), and submit job applications 
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(18%).322 These percentages increase among young adult 
smartphone owners.323 
If the pervasiveness and quality of usage regarding digital 
storage devices is not enough to convince of the need to limit gov-
ernmental power to search digital devices, it is worth noting that 
digital devices present the added problem of connectivity to the 
cloud, as noted infra in our discussion of Riley v. California. As the 
Ninth Circuit noted in United States v. Cotterman, digital devices 
are “conduit[s] to retrieving information from the cloud, akin to the 
key to a safe deposit box.”324 Just by having access to the digital 
device itself, a person has access to every account and offsite store 
of information a person possesses. With that in mind it is difficult 
to argue that allowing law enforcement access to the whole digital 
device is not an abuse of discretion and in direct violation of every-
thing for which the Fourth Amendment stands. 
3. The Impossibility of “Virtual Certainty” Regarding the 
Contents of Digital Containers 
Due to the unique characteristics of digital devices, it is virtu-
ally impossible for law enforcement to be sufficiently certain of 
what they will find upon the digital device. For that reason, 
searches of the whole digital device cannot satisfy the “virtual cer-
tainty” requirement of Jacobsen. Digital device searches “tend to 
be unusually invasive.”325 Digital evidence, likewise, often can re-
veal so much more evidence, in both quality and quantity, than 
physical evidence.326 When one opens a physical container, the con-
tents inside are fixed, meaning just by viewing the inside of the 
container, you can know with “virtual certainty” what that con-
tainer will hold. The same cannot be said of a digital container. 
When one opens a digital folder on a computer, it is not imme-
diately obvious what that folder contains. A private actor could 
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open the folder and find evidence of child pornography through im-
ages and videos. However, unless the private actor views every sin-
gle data file in that folder, the folder’s contents are still a mystery. 
The only thing the private actor knows with certainty is that the 
opened images and videos contain child pornography. 
When the private actor then replicates the search for the gov-
ernment agent, the government agent is limited to the level of cer-
tainty the private actor had. The agent does not gain additional 
certainty regarding the contents of the container just by his or her 
expertise. The risk that the government agent, if allowed to search 
the whole folder, or the whole device, will find private information 
for which the expectation of privacy has not been frustrated is too 
great to allow such latitude. The subsequent government search 
cannot possibly satisfy the “virtual certainty” requirement of Ja-
cobsen, and therefore, the subsequent search exceeds the scope of 
the private search and is impermissible without a warrant. 
The foregoing policy discussion strongly mandates a finding 
that the only permissible search technique to be used in private 
search doctrine cases of digital devices is the virtual file approach. 
In this sense, the Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have it cor-
rect. These circuits see that the virtual file approach is the only 
approach that adequately and unwaveringly preserves the purpose 
of the Fourth Amendment and ensures we, as a nation, remain free 
from arbitrary governmental intrusion. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
As this comment makes evident, there are many dangers in 
allowing a subsequent government search, following a private 
search, to view the whole contents of a digital storage device. For 
that reason, the proper approach to determining the scope of the 
subsequent government search should be that of the Sixth, Ninth, 
and Eleventh Circuits, finding that the government search is lim-
ited in scope to the individual images or files viewed by the private 
actor. This approach preserves the reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy that device owners have in their property, furthers the goals 
of the Fourth Amendment, and prevents abuse of discretion by law 
enforcement officers. 
